Regulating a Dominant Firm: Unknown Demand and Industry Structure
研究当存在一个未受规制的竞争对手时，如何最优规制一家主导企业。分析了在完全信息和不完全信息下的最优定价策略，发现主导企业的价格可能高于或低于边际成本，且不完全信息下可能采用混同或分离策略。
In this article, we study the optimal regulation of a dominant firm when an unregulated firm actively competes. Generally, the existence of an active rival imposes new and binding constraints on regulatory problems. We characterize optimal policies both when demands are known (complete information) and unknown (incomplete information) to the regulator. Optimal policies under complete information may set the price at the dominant firm above or below its marginal cost. Optimal policies under incomplete information may be either pooling or separating, constant over a range of the prior distribution of the firm's private information, and leave no information rent to the firm.