Clawbacks and Cronyism: Evidence from China
研究高管薪酬追回条款对中国银行贷款政策的影响，发现该条款实施后四大国有银行的裙带贷款减少，而非四大银行仍存在政治关联贷款优惠。
This paper is the first to examine the long‐term impact on bank lending policy of clawbacks in executive compensation contracts. Using a hand‐gathered database of Chinese business lending, we find evidence of reduced cronyism at the Big Four Chinese banks during the period after the introduction of a clawback program, marking a shift from earlier studies covering earlier time periods that find evidence of widespread cronyism at the Big Four banks. Politically connected borrowers received fewer and smaller loans relative to non‐Big Four banks, consistent with a backlash against cronyism at the Big Four banks. In contrast, we find that cronyism persisted (i.e., politically connected borrowers received more and larger loans) at non‐Big Four Chinese banks where the clawback policy was not effective.