Information, Investment Horizon, and Price Reactions
研究信息不对称下企业的动态投资策略，发现优质企业会短视投资于早期现金流项目，而劣质企业则选择长期高价值项目，并解释股权发行公告效应、现金囤积及强制披露规则偏好等现象。
This paper studies the dynamic investment policies of firms under asymmetric information.Managers make decisions to maximize the wealth of existing shareholders. In equilibrium, the superior firms invest “myopically”, choosing intrinsically lower-valued projects that produce “early” cash flows. The inferior firms follow the socially preferred rule of investing in intrinsically higher-valued projects that produce “late” cash flows. In addition to explaining investment myopia, the model generates numerous predictions regarding announcement effects of equity issues and attempts by firms to stockpile cash, firms' preferences for limits on mandatory disclosure rules, and the effects of managerial entrenchment motives.