Taxation and Welfare in an Oligopoly with Strategic Commitment
分析寡头市场中企业先进行成本削减研发投资、再决定产量的两阶段博弈，研究消费税或补贴对产出、研发投资和社会福利的短期与长期影响。
This paper establishes comparative statics results for an oligopoly model with strategic commitment. Firms compete in two stages. In the first stage, firms decide on strategic cost-reducing R&D investment, whereas they choose output in the second stage. Taking an excise tax/subsidy as a shift parameter in the second stage game, the short-run as well as long-run effects on output, cost-reducing R&D investment, and second-best welfare will be examined. The crucial role played by the strategic substitutability of outputs as well as cost-reducing R&D investments is clarified, and a variant of the Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle in the authors' game-theoretic model is obtained. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.