Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: A Contingency Framework
整合组织与制度理论，提出高管薪酬的权变方法，评估其在不同组织和制度背景下的有效性，并讨论软法与硬法等薪酬政策的影响。
Executive Overview By integrating organizational and institutional theories, this paper develops a contingency approach to executive remuneration and assesses its effectiveness in different organizational and institutional contexts. Most of the executive remuneration research focuses on the principal-agent framework and assumes a universal link between executive incentives and performance outcomes. We suggest a framework that examines executive compensation in terms of its organizational contexts and potential complementarities/substitution effects between different corporate governance practices at both the firm and national levels. We also discuss the implications for different approaches to executive compensation policy such as “soft law” and “hard law.”