Political Connections and Elite Capture in a Poverty Alleviation Programme in India
利用全印代表性家庭调查数据，发现与地方政治精英有联系的家庭获得扶贫配给卡的概率显著更高，且这一现象在城乡普遍存在，对扶贫对象识别政策有启示。
Political elite capture in public welfare programmes is rife in the low-income countries. Analysing a nationally-representative Indian household survey dataset, we examine the political connections hypothesis and find that a household connected to a local political executive (somebody close or as a family member) vis-à-vis not connected significantly increases the probability of its obtaining an important poverty-alleviating entitlement; that is, a below-poverty-line ration card in all three contexts: national, rural, and urban. This ubiquity of political elite capture at the local government level has guiding policy implications for the beneficiary identification process in the future.