Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps
研究多个知情投标者竞标时，投标成本随报价递增且存在投标上限的情况。发现若成本函数为线性或凹性，设上限无益于提高平均报价；若为凸性且投标者足够多，设上限则有利。
We study contests where several privately informed agents bid for a price. All bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids, and, moreover, bids may be capped. We show that, regardless of the number of bidders, if agents have linear or concave cost functions then setting a bid cap is not profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the average bid. On the other hand, if agents have convex cost functions (i.e. an increasing marginal cost) then affectively capping the bids is profitable for a designer facing a sufficiently large number of bidders.