The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study
汇总七篇论文的数据，研究标准最后通牒博弈中回应者行为如何随经验变化，发现高报价更易被接受、低报价更易被拒绝，且与互惠偏好模型最吻合。
Abstract Using data aggregated from seven papers that study repeated play in standard ultimatum games with either stranger or absolute stranger matching, we show that the behavior of responders changes with experience. High offers are more likely to be accepted with experience and low offers are more likely to be rejected. At the individual level, there is a negative relationship between the likelihood that a given offer is accepted and the size of the preceding offer. We compare the results with predictions generated by static models of distributional preferences, implicitly dynamic models of preferences with reciprocity, and explicitly dynamic models of adaptive learning. The data is most consistent with models of preferences with reciprocity.