Testing Cost Inefficiency Under Free Entry in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry
构建了一个实证框架，利用美国人口普查数据估计房地产经纪人的收入和保留工资，发现自由进入下存在显著的成本无效率，主要源于浪费的非价格竞争，并评估了部分州禁止返佣政策的福利影响。
This article provides an empirical framework for studying entry and cost inefficiency in the real estate brokerage industry. We present a structural entry model that exploits individual level data on entry and earnings to estimate potential real estate agents' revenues and reservation wages, thereby recovering costs of providing brokerage service. Using U.S. Census data, we estimate the model and find strong evidence for cost inefficiency under free entry, attributable in particular to wasteful nonprice competition. We further use the estimated model to evaluate welfare implications of the rebate bans that currently persist in some U.S. states. Supplemental materials are provided online.