The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
报告了美国国家住院医师匹配项目新清算所的设计，该市场存在互补性，但计算实验表明简单匹配理论仍有效，且稳定匹配集和策略操纵空间意外地小，核心收敛结果解释了这一现象。
We report on the design of the new clearinghouse adopted by the National Resident Matching Program, which annually fills approximately 20,000 jobs for new physicians. Because the market has complementarities between applicants and between positions, the theory of simple matching markets does not apply directly. However, computational experiments show the theory provides good approximations. Furthermore, the set of stable matchings, and the opportunities for strategic manipulation, are surprisingly small. A new kind of “core convergence” result explains this; that each applicant interviews only a small fraction of available positions is important. We also describe engineering aspects of the design process.