Cheap-Talk Coordination of Entry by Privately Informed Firms
比较了拥有私有信息的潜在进入者之间，在进入博弈前进行顺序或同时廉价磋商（如进入预告）的效果，发现廉价磋商能实现每种情况下的高效协调，且顺序磋商能产生更多样的高效结果。
I analyze and compare the effects of sequential and simultaneous cheap-talk communication (e.g., preannouncement of entry) among privately informed potential entrants who then play a normal-form entry game. The first main result is that cheap-talk communication is powerful enough to enable the potential entrants to coordinate on an efficient outcome for each and every contingency. The second is that sequential cheap talk is more dextrous in this task in the sense that it can generate a greater variety of efficient outcomes than simultaneous cheap talk. The precise extent to which it does so is also explained.