Domestic Costs of Statutory Marketing Authorities: The Case of the Canadian Wheat Board
以加拿大小麦局为例，分析法定营销机构因垄断权力导致过度提供营销服务，增加农民成本、降低收入，对政策制定者和农业经济学家有参考价值。
Abstract The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is a statutory marketing authority with exclusive control over exports of Canadian wheat and barley and sole authority over domestic marketing of milling wheat and malting barley. It is a government marketing board with implicit monopoly rights over the supply of wide‐ranging marketing services to farmers, but with no legal responsibility to farmers. These characteristics fit a stylized Niskanen model of bureaucratic decision making, where the CWB is modeled as supplying excess marketing services to farmers. Allowing the market to determine the quantity of marketing services would result in lower marketing costs and presumably higher farm incomes.