Involuntary Unemployment and Worker Moral Hazard
批判性地检验了隐性劳动合同中非自愿解雇用于惩罚工人表现不佳的假设，指出在重复道德风险下工人承担解雇风险，但最优合同更多涉及非自愿留任而非解雇。
This paper critically examines the hypothesis that layoffs are involuntary in implicit labour contracts because they are used by employers to punish inferior worker performance. In repeated moral hazard situations, workers typically bear risk associated with whether they are chosen to be laid off even though the latter is uninformative about previous effort choices and wages are performance-contingent. However the hypothesis is unsatisfactory as optimal contracts involve involuntary retentions rather than involuntary layoffs in a wide variety of circumstances.