Marital Division of Labor with Risk of Divorce: The Role of "Voice" Enforcement of Contracts
假设情感纽带可通过“呼声”执行隐性婚姻合同，离婚不仅破坏规模经济，还削弱这种执行机制；研究发现离婚概率上升对离婚前时间分配的影响方向不确定，即使偏好同质。
It is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce impli cit marital contracts by "voice." Therefore, in the present model, divorc e has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for suc h "voice" enforcement is weakened. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, the author finds that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time, even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.