Duopoly prices under congested access*
研究了不同位置的两家厂商在消费者出行拥堵下的定价，发现纳什均衡价格高于边际生产成本与外部出行成本之和，但若道路与其他竞争市场共享，则价格等于竞争价格。
Abstract. Consider two firms, at different locations, supplying a homogenous good at constant marginal production cost. Consumers incur travel costs to the firm for each unit purchased, and the travel costs increase with the amount of travel to each firm (congestion). When all traffic and all congestion are generated by travel to a duopolist, both the Nash–Bertrand equilibrium prices and the Nash–Cournot equilibrium prices exceed the sum of the marginal production cost and the marginal external travel cost. However, when the road is shared by travelers to the duopolists' facilities and travelers in competitive markets, the Nash–Bertrand duopoly price equals the competitive price and the Nash–Cournot price contains a markup.