Disaggregating Management Forecasts to Reduce Investors’ Susceptibility to Earnings Fixation
通过实验研究发现，当投资者先看到分解的管理层预测（包含盈利及其组成部分）而非汇总预测（仅盈利总额）时，他们对已公布盈利数字的过度关注会降低，这有助于投资者更均衡地评估信息。
ABSTRACT: This study examines disaggregated management forecasts as a mechanism to reduce investors’ fixation on announced earnings. Our experimental results suggest that investors’ earnings fixation is reduced when they initially observe a disaggregated management forecast (earnings and its components) versus when they observe an aggregated forecast (earnings only). We also provide theory-consistent evidence that this reduction in earnings fixation is associated with investors interpreting the summary net income figure as one of several similarly important evaluation inputs rather than a substantially more important input (relative to its components). Finally, we provide evidence that suggests our results are not bounded by the level of emphasis on net income in the subsequent earnings announcement, and not fully explained by three plausible alternative explanations. Our study extends the voluntary disclosure literature by providing evidence that the form of management disclosures can influence investors’ interpretation of subsequently announced information, and contributes to practice by providing a potential alternative to stopping earnings guidance.