Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives
用经济学模型分析宗教行为，认为理性个体组成的宗教团体可能从污名、自我牺牲和奇怪的行为限制中获益，也适用于非宗教的社会俱乐部。
This paper presents an economic analysis of religious behavior that accounts for the continuing success of groups with strange requirements and seemingly inefficient prohibitions. The analysis does not presuppose any special motives for religious activity. Rather, religion is modeled as a club good that displays positive returns to "participatory crowding." The analysis demonstrates that efficient religions with perfectly rational members may benefit from stigma, self-sacrifice, and bizarre behavioral restrictions. The model also addresses sacrifice in nonreligious "social clubs": fraternities, communes, political parties, work groups, and families. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.