家族与非家族企业研发投资差异:行为代理与短视损失规避视角

Variations in R&D Investments of Family and Nonfamily Firms: Behavioral Agency and Myopic Loss Aversion Perspectives

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL · 2012
被引 1356 · 同刊同年前 4%
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

结合行为代理模型和短视损失规避框架,研究家族企业与非家族企业在研发投资上的差异,发现家族企业通常投资更少但波动更大,业绩低于目标时投资增加且波动减小。

Abstract

The behavioral agency model suggests that to preserve socioemotional wealth, loss-averse family firms usually invest less in R&D than nonfamily firms. However, behavioral agency model predictions are inconsistent with the well-accepted premise that family firms have a long-term investment orientation. We reconcile these seemingly incompatible predictions by adding insights from the myopic loss aversion framework, which deals with the impact of decision-making time horizons. The combination of these two prospect theory derivatives led us to hypothesize that family firms usually invest less in R&D than nonfamily firms but the variability of their investments will be greater owing to differences in the compatibility of long- and short-term family goals with the economic goals of a firm. However, when performance is below aspiration levels, we theorize that family goals and economic goals tend to converge. In this situation, the R&D investments of family firms are expected to increase and the variability of those investments decrease, relative to nonfamily firms. Analysis of 964 publicly held family and nonfamily firms from the Standard & Poor's 1500 between 1998 and 2007 support our hypotheses, confirming a need to take the heterogeneity of family firms more fully into account.

家族企业研发投资行为代理模型短视损失规避企业治理