An Interest Group Model of Direct Income Redistribution
构建并检验了一个利益集团模型，解释直接向低收入者再分配收入的政策决定因素，发现受益水平受纳税人收入、利益集团力量和政党竞争影响，并使用AFDC数据验证了模型。
An interest group model of the determinants of policies which directly re distribute income to low income persons is developed and tested. The model assum es that altruistic taxpayers, nonaltruistic taxpayers, and needy beneficiaries f orm separate interest groups from which politicians seek support. Benefit levels depend on variables such as taxpayer income and the price of benefits but, unlike median voter models, the model also implies a role for interest group strengt h and competition between political parties. The author uses latent variable met hods and data on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program to demonstr ate empirical support forthe model. Copyright 1986 by MIT Press.