Arbitrage, Short Sales, and Financial Innovation
构建了一个不完全市场的一般均衡模型，分析企业发行任意成本证券进行金融创新的行为。研究发现，禁止卖空时企业竞争均衡有效；允许卖空则可能导致不完全竞争或效率损失，因为创新对企业的私人收益与社会收益存在差异。
The authors describe a model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets in which firms can innovate by issuing arbitrary, costly securities. When short sales are prohibited, firms behave competitively and equilibrium is efficient. When short sales are allowed, these classical properties may fail. If unlimited short sales are allowed, imperfect competition may persist even when the number of potential innovators is large. If limited short sales are allowed, perfect competition may obtain in the limit, but equilibrium can be inefficient because of the presence of an externality: the private benefits of innovation for firms differ from the social benefits. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.