U.S. Investors' Perceptions of Corporate Control in Mexico: Evidence from Sibling ADRs
研究同一家外国公司发行的不同投票权孪生美国存托凭证的相对价格，发现墨西哥公司的超级投票权凭证折价交易，与常见溢价现象相反，可能源于控制权向债权人和竞争对手转移。
We examine the relative prices of sibling American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). These ADRs are issued against classes of shares with different voting rights that are issued by the same foreign firm. Though superior and inferior voting siblings begin trading in the U.S. at nearly equal values, prices quickly separate. For non-Mexican issues, superior voting ADRs command a premium. For Mexican issues, superior voting shares trade at a discount. The Mexican discount is inconsistent with the benefits of U.S. listing discussed in other recent studies and cannot be explained by differences in cash flow rights, systematic risk, liquidity, voting control of major blockholders, or ownership restrictions. Our analysis suggests, however, that control for our Mexican firms has shifted to creditors and competitors, thus, eroding equity voting premiums.