Strategy implementation versus middle management self‐interest
运用期望理论研究中层管理者在战略实施中的动机，发现当其自身利益受威胁时，会采取干预、拖延甚至破坏策略的行为。
Abstract This paper focuses on middle management motivation to implement strategy. It uses expectancy theory to predict that middle managers will intervene in organizational decision‐making processes leading to strategy implementation when their self‐interest is at stake. It develops the notion of ‘counter effort’, as an extension of expectancy theory. The paper reports an empirical study of middle management intervention theory. The data and analysis of this study provide strong, if indirect, evidence that middle managers who believe that their self‐interest is being compromised can not only redirect a strategy, delay its implementation or reduce the quality of its implementation, but can also even totally sabotage the strategy. Implications of the study for the management of strategy implementation are developed.