Quantifying the supply‐side benefits from forward contracting in wholesale electricity markets
利用多单元多时段拍卖中的预期利润最大化投标行为假设，估计发电机组成本函数，并检验该行为假设。基于澳大利亚国家电力市场数据，发现产出依赖的边际成本显著存在，但未拒绝利润最大化假设；远期合同义务可使日均生产成本降低8%。
Abstract The assumption of expected profit‐maximizing bidding behavior in a multi‐unit, multi‐period auction with step‐function supply curves is used to estimate cost functions for electricity generation units and derive tests of expected profit‐maximizing behavior. Applying these techniques to data from the National Electricity Market in Australia reveals statistically significant evidence of output‐dependent marginal costs within and across half‐hours of the day, but no evidence against the hypothesis of expected profit‐maximizing behavior. These cost function estimates quantify the economic significance of output‐varying costs and how forward financial contract obligations impact the amount of these costs the generation unit owner incurs. This supplier's existing obligations imply average daily production costs that are 8% lower than the profit‐maximizing pattern of output with no forward contract obligations. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.