公共部门的合同外包:理论、证据与前景

Contracting out by the public sector: theory, evidence, prospects

Oxford Review of Economic Policy · 1997
被引 526 · 同刊同年前 3%
人大 A-ABS 2

中文导读

研究公共部门合同外包的理论与证据,发现通过竞争性招标可实现约20%的成本节约,且不牺牲服务质量,对政策制定者和公共管理者有参考价值。

Abstract

Unlike privatization, contracting out (or simply 'contracting') does not generally involve the sale of publicly owned assets. Yet it has been widely used as a mechanism for reform of public-sector service provision. Contracting introduces ex-ante competition-competition for the market through competitive tendering. This article examines both the theory and evidence of contracting by the public sector. It considers the theoretical conditions, such as contractual incompleteness and the ownership of physical assets, which may impede efficient contracting. It also reviews the international evidence which suggests that savings in the order of 20 percent are achievable, without sacrificing the quality of service provided. In the UK, savings of between 240m Pounds and 280m Pounds have been estimated for contracts let at the central government level. Substantial savings have also been generated by contracting at the local government level. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

公共部门外包竞争性招标合同不完全性成本节约