The North American Fur Trade: Bargaining to a Joint Profit Maximum under Incomplete Information, 1804–1821
利用不完全信息谈判模型，分析西北公司和哈德逊湾公司之间的谈判过程，发现合并虽实现联合利润最大化，但信息不完全和策略承诺导致谈判成本高昂并损耗动物资源。
We examine bargaining between the Northwest Company and the Hudson's Bay Company using recent models of bargaining under incomplete information. Two previously undisturbed bodies of correspondence are analyzed: letters between the two companies and letters between the Hudson's Bay Company and its London committee. Through merger the companies achieved a joint maximum, but the lengthy and costly bargaining process dissipated much of the potential gain through depletion of animal stocks. Achievement of a joint maximum was hindered by incomplete information, commitment to a strategy which led to bargaining breakdowns, delineation of each party's rights under law, and environmental changes.