Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self‐interest, and Managerial Compensation
研究管理者自利行为如何影响跨国经营的价值，并考察管理者薪酬能否通过激励缓解代理问题，发现高成长企业（托宾Q>1）的跨国投资被市场视为增值，而低成长企业（托宾Q<1）则因管理者自利而损害价值，且薪酬激励无效。
In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self‐interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high‐ Q (Tobin’s Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high‐ Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low‐ Q firms (Tobin’s Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self‐interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value‐decreasing event. For low‐ Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value‐enhancing foreign direct investments.