Implementation of Social Welfare Functions
研究社会福利函数的可实施性，证明可实施的社会福利函数要么是常数、要么是独裁或逆独裁的，若仅拟传递则呈寡头结构。
A social welfare function f assigns to each economic environment p a continuous preorder f(p) on the space of allocations of private goods. f is implementable if for each large finite set Z the correspondence Phi (p) defined by selecting the set of f(p)-maximal allocations in Z is implementable. Then fis implementable only if it satisfies Arrow's independence axiom. Therefore, every implementable social welfare function is constant or dictatorial or inversely dictatorial. If f(p) is merely quasitransitive and f satisfies a basic nonimposition condition then f is oligarchical if it is implementable. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.