Bargaining over a Common Good with Private Information*
研究了两个参与者对共同物品进行顺序索取，第一行动者拥有关于物品规模的私人信息，实验发现私人信息降低了第一行动者的索取和利润，但多数行为符合完美贝叶斯均衡，且成功协调多发生在平分点。
Abstract Consider two agents who make sequential claims on a common good, receiving their respective claims only if these are compatible. We let the first mover be privately informed about the size of the good. Conventional theory predicts multiple equilibria, and the intuitive criterion predicts that the first player claims the entire good. Our experimental results reject the intuitive criterion. Private information reduces the claim and the profit of the first mover. However, we cannot reject that the subjects play according to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Most subjects play according to a PBE, and almost all successful coordination occurs at the even split.