The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
研究带转移支付的二元选择问题，分析平等主义与自由放任两种补偿规则，并用公理刻画各自特征，对理解公平与效率的权衡有参考价值。
A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered. We study two compensation rules, called social choice functions. The egalitarian rule divides equally the surplus above the average utility level. The laissez-faire rule chooses an efficient decision but performs no transfer. Egalitarianism is characterized by a monotonicity axiom called Agreement: no two agents ever disagree in comparing two distinct preferences of a third one. Laissez-fairism is characterized by the No Subsidy axiom: a coalition would not be worse off if the other agents were not present.