STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY
综述了产业经济学中关于策略性进入阻挠的最新研究，从贝恩的经典分析出发，用两阶段博弈模型展示进入阻挠问题的结构，讨论在位企业可用的策略变量及非合作阻挠的可能性，并回顾了实证证据。
Abstract. This paper reviews the recent developments in the economics of industry with respect to strategic entry deterrence. Starting from Bain's (1956) classical analysis, a simple two‐stage game between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant is used to present the general structure of the entry deterrence problem. Commitments, credible threat and sub‐game perfection are illustrated in this context. The various strategic variables that an incumbent firm can use to bar entry are discussed. The issue of whether a group of incumbents can non‐cooperatively deter entry is taken up and some empirical evidence is reviewed.