Analyzing Ultimatum Bargaining: A Bayesian Approach to the Comparison of Two Potency Curves Under Shape Constraints
用贝叶斯方法比较不同实验条件下最后通牒博弈中完美均衡的比例，发现实验者观察对博弈行为有微小影响，但不足以解释大部分偏离完美均衡的现象。
An experiment designed to test whether experimenter observation influences play of the ultimatum game led to a comparison of proportions of perfect equilibria obtained under different conditions. Our analysis features a Bayesian approach to this comparison. Our method extends recent work in the nonparametric Bayesian analysis of bioassay problems when the prior constrains the form of the potency curve. Sampling-based approaches to calculating posterior features of interest are used and discussed. We conclude that experimenter observation has a small influence but not enough to account for most of the deviation from perfect-equilibrium play.