Rate-Of-Return Regulation and Two-Part Tariffs
分析受回报率管制的垄断企业如何选择两部制定价，发现其更依赖需求弹性而非边际成本，且倾向于递减阶梯费率结构，解释了该定价在受管制企业中的普遍性。
In choosing a two-part tariff, a monopoly subject to rate-of-return regulation will rely more on demand elasticities and less on marginal costs than would a welfare-maximizing firm. The rate-of-return regulated firm also will reduce its access fee or its marginal usage fee more, depending on whether adding consumers or increasing output requires marginally the most capital. In the typical case these effects will favor declining-block rate structures, which helps to explain their widespread use by rate-of-return regulated firms.