Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
构建模型分析一个大投资者和众多小投资者基于私有信息决定是否攻击一国货币，发现大投资者的存在会使小投资者在基本面更强时也加入攻击，但影响大小取决于信息精度差异。
Do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets? To address this issue, we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals. Even abstracting from signalling, the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling. Relative to the case in which there is no large investor, small investors attack the currency when fundamentals are stronger. Yet, the difference can be small, or non-existent, depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors. Adding signalling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders' behaviour much stronger. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.