Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency
研究企业在消费者偏好和成本异质时，通过价格和质量竞争，比较一体化与分离市场下的均衡，解释心理健康保险剥离和学校选择中的“撇脂”现象。
Firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics. Consumers demand two goods, which can be supplied jointly or separately by firms. We consider two strategy regimes for firms: uniform price-quality pairs, and screening price-quality menus. For each regime, we compare the equilibria under integration (each firm supplying both goods) and separation (each firm supplying one good). Integrating and separating markets change quality, efficiency, and welfare. The theory illustrates phenomena such as the carveout of mental health and substance abuse coverage from general health insurance, and creaming for low-cost students in locales with school choices. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.