Sargent‐Wallace Meets Krugman‐Flood‐Garber, or: Why Sovereign Debt Swaps do not Avert Macroeconomic Crises
解释主权债务互换常失败的原因：市场对财政收支缺口的评估驱动根本力量，当国家接近部分违约时，互换可能无法缓解危机甚至加速其到来。
This paper argues that the frequent failure of the debt swaps follows from fundamental forces driven by the market's assessment of the scarcity of fiscal revenue relative to the demand for fiscal outlays. As a country approaches the range of partial default, swaps may not provide the expected breathing room and could even bring the crisis forward. Our methodology combines three independent themes: exchange rate crises as the manifestation of excessive monetary injections, the fiscal theory of inflation and sovereign debt. The integrated framework derives devaluation and external debt repudiation as part of a public-finance optimising problem. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.