Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives
研究了信用评级机构分析师在可能跳槽到银行的情况下，其激励合同如何影响评级准确性，发现监管、银行盈利能力和离职概率对准确性有不同影响。
The financial crisis has brought a new focus on the accuracy of credit rating agencies (CRAs). In this paper, we highlight the incentives of analysts at the CRAs to provide accurate ratings. We construct a model in which analysts initially work at a CRA and can then either remain or move to a bank. The CRA uses incentive contracts to motivate analysts, but does not capture the benefits if the analyst moves. We find that rating agency accuracy increases with CRA monitoring, bank profitability (a positive “revolving door” effect), and can be non-monotonic in the probability of an analyst leaving.