Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence
在霍特林模型框架下重新审视了进入威胁是否促使在位企业增加产品数量，发现进入遏制虽最优，但未必通过产品扩散实现，有时选址策略更有效，且产品数量可能超过遏制所需的最低数量。
Within a slightly modified version of Hotelling's model we reconsider the claim that the threat of entry induces existing firms to produce a larger number of products than they would otherwise. We show that entry deterrence, although optimal, need not be achieved through product proliferation. In some cases the incumbent monopolist resorts to an entry-deterring strategy based on location choice rather than product proliferation. We also show that in some cases the number of products chosen by the incumbent facing the threat of entry is strictly greater than the minimum number required to deter entry.