Tariffs, Quotas, and Market Structure
分析关税和配额对国内垄断者与国外垄断者双头垄断定价模式的影响，发现配额下国内企业总是价格领导者，而关税下领导地位不确定，且配额导致更高国内价格。
This paper examines the effects of tariffs and quotas on the pricing pattern of producers in the case of duopoly by a domestic monopolist and a foreign monopolist. It is pointed out that tariffs and quotas may induce completely different pricing patterns in the two producers. Under a quota, it is always profitable for the home producer to be a price leader and for the foreign producer to be a follower, whereas under a tariff either producer may become a leader. It is also proved that, whatever leader-follower relation is chosen under a tariff, a quota always bring about a higher domestic price than the tariff as long as both permit the same amount of imports.