Incentive Asymmetries in the Mergers and Acquisitions Process*
研究并购过程中激励不对称如何导致项目数量增加、柠檬市场问题、合同延长、估值偏误、价格攀升及整合受阻，并探讨高/低强度激励方案的解决作用。
abstract This paper focuses on the relationship between incentive asymmetries and some potentially undesirable outcomes along the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) process which could potentially destroy the shareholder value of the merged corporate entity. Incentive asymmetries are seen as belonging to the three categories of ‘risk‐antecedent’, ‘information‐antecedent’ and ‘pure self‐interest antecedent’. We propose that incentive asymmetries are responsible for increases in the number of M&A projects and that they might create a ‘lemons problem’ with M&A candidates. Incentive asymmetries are also suggested to lead to prolonged contract‐writing phases, biased financial evaluations and acquisition price escalation, as well as undermined post‐M&A integration plans. If resolutions to these problems are sought, the use of high‐ and low‐powered incentive schemes will need to reflect risk, information and pure self‐interest.