Coase versus Pacman: Who Eats Whom in the Durable-Goods Monopoly?
研究耐用品垄断模型中，当买家集合或价格集合为有限时，均衡结果如何从科斯定理转向完全价格歧视，并扩展到寡头市场。
In standard durable-goods monopoly models, both the set of buyers and the set of prices are assumed to be continua. If the set of buyers is finite, the perfectly discriminating monopoly outcome is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when the seller is sufficiently patient. Introducing instead a smallest unit of account yields the Coasian outcome as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium for patient enough buyers. A folk theorem is obtained if both sets are finite. These results reflect a strategic disadvantage of having to make moves with a large impact on other players' payoffs. The analysis is extended to durable-goods oligopoly. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.