Competition and Cooperation Within a Multidivisional Firm
研究多部门公司中总部如何设计经理激励方案，以在部门间促进合作或竞争，取决于技术溢出或产品替代关系。
The strategic choice of managerial incentives is studied in a multiagent setting using a two-stage game. In the first stage, the principal chooses incentive schemes. Then, agents make their decisions. The game models the structure of multidivisional firms; divisions (agents) are managed independently but the general office (principal) monitors their performance and provides incentives. It explains the rationale for establishing either cooperation or competition across divisions if firms face Cournot competition. If divisions are linked because of technological reasons (positive spillovers), cooperation should be stimulated. If they sell substitute products (negative spillovers), competition is needed. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.