Insiders, Outsiders, and Market Breakdowns
用一个简单的瓦尔拉斯模型分析信息不对称下知情交易者（内部人）与不知情交易者（外部人）之间的博弈，指出当内部人的信息交易动机超过对冲动机时，外部人会拒绝交易，导致市场崩溃，并证明该结论对非线性策略也成立。
A simple classical Walrasian framework is proposed for the study of manipulation among asymmetrically informed risk-averse traders in financial markets, and it is used to analyze the occurrence of a market breakdown in the trading system. Such a phenomenon occurs when the outsiders refuse to trade with the insiders because the informational motive for trade of the insider outweighs her hedging motive. We demonstrate the robustness of our results by proving that the market collapse condition extends not only to the linear strategy function, but to the whole class of feasible nonlinear strategy functions. Implications for insider-trading regulation are sketched.