Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: The US Radio Industry
利用1996-2006年美国广播业并购浪潮的数据，通过结构模型分析并购对听众和广告商福利的影响，发现听众福利微增0.2%而广告商福利下降21%。
This study examines mergers in two-sided markets using a structural supply-and-demand model that employs data from the 1996–2006 merger wave in the US radio industry. In particular, it identifies the conflicting incentives for merged firms to exercise market power on both listener and advertiser sides of the market, and disaggregates the effects of mergers into changes in product variety and advertising quantity. Specifically, it finds 0.2 percent listener welfare increase (+0.3 percent from increased product variety, and −0.1 percent from decreased ad quantity) and 21 percent advertiser welfare decrease (−17 percent from changes in product variety, and −5 percent from decreased ad quantity).