The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation Building: A Further Test
通过借贷博弈实验检验Kreps-Wilson声誉构建模型的定性预测，发现理论无法解释参数变化带来的行为变化，且对借款人收益函数的反应方向与理论预测相反。
We experimentally test some qualitative predictions of the Kreps-Wilson (1982b) model of reputation building in a version of a borrower-lender game first used by Camerer-Weigelt (1988). Our results do not differ substantially from those of CamererWeigelt-when we use the same parameters they used. However, we find that the theory fails to account for observed behavioral variations to parameter changes. There is a systematic response to changes in the payoff function of the borrowers, but this response is not in the direction predicted by the theory. This cannot be reconciled with the theory by an appeal to homemade priors of the type specified by Camerer-Weigelt. Furthermore, the estimated magnitude of homemade priors in the Camerer-Weigelt experiment is inconsistent with estimates derived from behavior observed in our own experiment.