Law Enforcement and Firm Financing: Theory and Evidence
研究发现，审判时间更长的司法辖区，企业银行融资成本更高、规模更小，但执法力度与杠杆率无显著关联。理论模型表明，加强债权人权利执法不仅改善信贷条件，还促进个人资本积累。
This paper investigates the economic effects on firms' policies of differences in law enforcement. We find that in judicial districts where trials are longer, bank financing is more costly and firms are smaller. However, we do not find any significant relation between law enforcement and firms' leverage ratio. We rationalize our results within a two- region dynamic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information and collateralized credit contracts. We find that a stronger enforcement of creditors' rights not only improves credit conditions (partial equilibrium effect), but also fosters individual capital accumulation (general equilibrium effect). In line with this theoretical prediction, we find a positive relation between individual savings and quality of legal enforcement.