Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts
建立了一个基于双边道德风险的简单模型，解释为何现实中收入/利润分成合约常采用简单的线性形式，且很少根据个体或市场情况精细调整，为合约设计提供理论依据。
Contractual arrangements involving revenue/profit sharing are often based on fairly simple, often linear, rules. In addition, in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets, nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should. We develop a simple model of such revenue- or profit-sharing arrangements based on double-sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts. More specifically, the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can, in some cases, be quite limited, if not zero.