Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts
用激励合同方法分析当投保人可虚报损失时的最优保险合同，发现有效合同会容忍一定程度的欺诈，但通过差异化赔付来抑制过度虚报，对保险设计和反欺诈有参考价值。
An incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims. We demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensates small losses while overpaying larger ones. The differential costs of generating insurance claims through falsification provide an avenue by which the heterogencous insureds can credibly signal their underlying losses and are exploited in an optimal contract to implement loss‐contingent insurance payments.