Hold-Up and Sequential Specific Investments
研究当各方可以同时或顺序进行投资时的敲竹杠问题。顺序投资能让一些在同时投资下不可行的项目得以进行，但也会削弱部分参与者的投资激励，甚至导致交易无法发生，这被解释为一种新的敲竹杠形式。
We explore the hold-up problem when parties can make investments simultaneously or sequentially. Sequencing of investments can allow some projects to proceed that would not be feasible with a simultaneous regime. However, a cost of sequencing is that it can disadvantage some parties, reducing their incentive to invest. The mere possibility of sequential investment can prevent trade from occurring; this can be interpreted as a new form of hold-up. If both parties prefer to invest second, as the number of potential investment periods is increased, the subgame-perfect equilibrium can switch between a prisoners' dilemma and a coordination game.