Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankruptcy constraints
研究两个风险中性代理人在相关环境中受破产约束时，直接机制能否诱导真实信息披露，发现一类例子中纳什约束可产生子博弈占优策略均衡，但一般情形下直接机制实施仍较复杂。
We explore the effects of bankruptcy constraints on incentive schemes when two risk-neutral agents operate in correlated environments. Our focus is on the subgame equilibrium in which each agent is induced via a direct mechanism to truthfully reveal his private information as a Nash response to truth-telling by his counterpart. We identify a class of examples in which, in contrast to the case where the agents are risk-averse, the Nash constraints induce a subgame dominant strategy equilibrium. Thus implementation via direct mechanisms is feasible for this class. More generally, however, the truth-telling Nash equilibrium may be subgame dominated, so the question of implementation via direct mechanisms remains a delicate one.