The Effect of Job Heterogeneity on Reservation Wages
构建了一个工作搜寻模型，其中工作因检验和经验不确定性而异，导致保留工资在失业期间可能不恒定或下降，并产生负的持续时间依赖，对控制未观测异质性的传统方法提出质疑。
This paper develops a model of job search in which jobs differ in the amount of inspection and experience uncertainty. Under these circumstances, reservation wages may not remain constant or decrease over an unemployment spell. Even if job offer rates are constant over an unemployment spell, negative duration dependence of the reemployment hazard can occur when individuals search amongst a variety of jobs. Since this duration dependence is a result of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, conventional methods for controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in reduced-form hazard models are inappropriate. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.